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ABSTRACT
Same-sex marriage is a controversial topic subject to great debate. The Supreme Court
in 2015 federally recognized the legality of same-sex marriages in Obergefell v.
Hodges. Despite this ruling, some people looked for any reason to denounce the
holding. Perhaps none were more vocal than those who rejected same-sex marriage on
the basis of their religious tenets. Miller v. Davis provided people who were morally
opposed to same-sex marriage a platform to support their concerns grounded in a First
Amendment right to freedom of religion. The question is how far does one’s freedom
of religion extend? Does freedom of religion give one the right to deny to others their
federally recognized rights? Many have sought to define the boundaries separating
church and state; however, those boundaries remain malleable and oftentimes hard to
enforce, presenting a challenge to those seeking to define them. This comment
explores the bounds of freedom of religion and analyzes the rights and protections
associated with marriage. Specifically, this comment suggests a balancing test for
determining when a government official may exempt themselves from issuing
marriage licenses based on their religious tenets. Broadly, the test determines when
religious exemptions are appropriate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Denied . . .
Because they wanted to get married. 1
Denied . . .
Because someone felt what they were doing was wrong.2
Denied . . .
Because two civil liberties are in conflict . . . 3
And no one knows which will win or if both will lose. 4

O

n June 26, 2015, April Miller and Karen Roberts traveled to 600
Main Street in Morehead, Kentucky on a day they hoped to
remember forever. 5 They soon discovered they would remember the day
forever, but for an entirely different reason than they hoped. 6 In addition
to Ms. Miller and Ms. Roberts, three other couples — Kevin Holloway
and Jody Fernandez, Barry Spartman and Aaron Skaags, and Shantel
Burke and Stephen Napier — traveled to or called the Rowan County
Clerk’s office in hopes of getting marriage licenses to solemnize their
relationships. 7 All four couples were denied this right. 8 They had gone
to the County Clerk’s office after the Supreme Court came out of the
judicial closet with its decision Obergefell v. Hodges, which federally
recognized the right for same-sex couples to marry. 9 These couples were
denied their right to a marriage license because the county clerk, Kim
Davis, could not find it in her conscience to grant same-sex couples
marriage licenses. 10 Further, she instated a policy where no marriage

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
See id. at 929.
See id. at 930.
See id.
Kim Davis, KIM DAVIS COUNTY CLERK ROWAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY,
http://rowancountyclerk.com
(last
visited
Nov.
27,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/JU9M-MM7V]; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
See id. Two couples were same-sex, and two couples were heterosexual.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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licenses would be issued out of her office. 11 Davis claimed she could
not abide by the ruling in Obergefell as it violated her Apostolic
Christian beliefs. 12
The four couples argued that Davis violated their Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right as established in Loving v. Virginia, and
extended by Obergefell to include same-sex couples under its
protection. 13 The Obergefell ruling caused a stampede of opinions on
same-sex marriage to come to an already turbulent forefront by
providing a soapbox for many officials and individuals to profess their
own judgments on how the case should have been decided. 14
For many years, same-sex rights and equality questions were within
the specific domain of the states, but with reactions to the Defense of
Marriage Act, 15 and popular opinion in favor of more liberal policies,
the federal government began testing the waters of regulating LGBTQ
rights. 16 While the federal government began the whirlwind process
toward LGBTQ equality, fierce advocates protested against same-sex
marriage for religious reasons. 17 Governors, attorneys general, mayors,
and clerks were appalled as their morals and religious beliefs were tested
by the Obergefell decision. 18 Many sought ways to avoid its
enforcement, thus frustrating the balance between those enforcing the
law and the actual law. 19
Citizens are guaranteed the right to freedom of religion under the
First Amendment, which affirms that the government shall not involve
itself in matters of or inhibit the free exercise of religion. 20 Opponents
claim the Obergefell decision does exactly that. 21 Kim Davis used this
11
12
13

14
15
16

17

18
19
20
21

Id.
See id. at 932.
See id. at 934; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
See generally 1 MASS. PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 19:16 (4th ed.).
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 9 (2013).
See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Most States to Abide By Supreme Court’s Same-Sex
Marriage Ruling, but . . ., CNN (June 30, 2015, 8:20 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/29/us/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/6HPQ-9RLG]; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 930.
See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932.
See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see also Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932.
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as her excuse for not issuing any marriage licenses in her county. 22
Miller v. Davis gave people who were morally opposed to same-sex
marriage a platform to bring forth their concerns. 23 Many challenged the
Obergefell decision, and supported Kim Davis by alleging that
federalizing same-sex marriage violates the First Amendment. 24
Specifically, challengers claimed the Obergefell decision resulted in a
violation of their freedom of religion. 25
Freedom of religion is a fundamental tenet of the Bill of Rights.26
However, multiple times throughout history laws have come into
conflict with religious beliefs, and thus posed a challenge to one’s
freedom of religion. 27 The critical question remains: How far does a
person’s freedom of religion extend? 28 Are citizens excused from
following a law they believe conflicts with their religious beliefs? 29 Or
are they forced to follow a law despite their religious beliefs? 30 Thomas
Jefferson and others sought to define the boundaries separating church
and state; however, those boundaries remain malleable and oftentimes
hard to enforce. 31
Section I of this comment will give a brief history of the separation
of church and state, and how the courts and leading figures have
attempted to define its boundaries throughout history. Section II will
give a synopsis of the evolution of same-sex marriage law in the United
22
23
24

25
26
27

28
29
30
31

See id.
See McLaughlin, supra note 17; see generally Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 932.
See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 938-39. Kim Davis argued that the directive to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples was a violation of her First Amendment
right; specifically, it burdened her right to freedom of religion by forcing her to
act in contradiction to her closely-held religious beliefs. Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Anthony M. Lise, Bringing Down the Establishment: Faith-Based and
Community Initiative Funding, Christianity, and Same-Sex Equality, 12 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 129, 131 (2008). There has been a departure from Thomas
Jefferson’s notion of a strict separation of church and state. In recent times, the
government has involved itself in some ways in various religious practices and
organizations. Instead of the strict separation touted by the founders, there are
now a series of tests to determine when the government has gone too far in its
involvement in religion. Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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States. Section III will discuss the aftermath of the Obergefell decision
and provide a case study of Miller v. Davis to highlight the issue of
government officials who claim faith-based rationales for opposing
same-sex marriage in their official capacity. Section IV will use Miller
v. Davis and other historical and current cases to outline a balancing test
courts should use to determine whether government officials have the
right to claim an exemption from enforcing the law based on their right
to freedom of religion. Section V will conclude with an analysis of the
potential future effects of this test.
II. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
Religion and governmental functions have been inextricably linked
for the entirety of U.S. history. 32 In the early sessions of the Continental
Congress, convened to discuss aspects of the Revolutionary War and the
burgeoning government, religion was embraced as part of the delegates’
daily activities. 33 Despite these initial religious undertones in
government, tensions rose when religion was incorporated into
government processes. 34 For instance, in 1785, Virginia proposed the
adoption of a state religion. 35 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
vehemently opposed this idea as it interfered with the citizenry’s
freedoms. 36 James Madison believed, “[r]eligion then of every man
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.” 37 Thomas
Jefferson, too, wrote on the establishment of religion in Virginia:

32

33

34
35
36
37

JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 57-60 (2000).
See id. The First Continental Congress began each session with a prayer. The
Second Continental Congress used government funds to pay chaplains to offer
prayers at the beginning of each session and to serve in the military. Further, the
Continental Congress endorsed days of fasting and prayer.
See Lise, supra note 27, at 141.
See id.
Id. at 141-42.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in
Virginia
(June
20,
1785),
http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/KA7Q-ER49]; see also Lise, supra note 27, at
141; DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES 8
(2003).
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No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in
his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account
of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in
no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities. 38
Despite Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to religious entanglement
with government proceedings, the Framers of the Constitution viewed
religious liberties as beyond the purview of the federal government, and
within the states’ authority. 39
Following the Revolutionary War, from May 25, 1787, to
September 17, 1787, state delegates convened to develop a Constitution
for the newly liberated states. 40 There were a few general references to
religion in the Constitution, but no explicit statement of the separation
of church and state. 41 The Constitution was, in effect, “Godless.”42
Religious matters were left for the states to decide. 43 On September 28,
1787, the Continental Congress unanimously voted to approve the
Constitution. 44 It was then sent to the states to garner the minimum nine38

39

40
41

42
43

44

Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Jan. 16,
1786),
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primarysources/virginia-act-establishing-religious-freedom (last visited Dec. 2, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/B9DK-7TG5]; see also Lise, supra note 27, at 141; CONKLE,
supra note 37, at 9-10.
See WITTE, supra note 32, at 61. Eleven of the thirteen states had already
incorporated religious liberty clauses into their state constitutions. Rhode Island
and Connecticut did not write a new constitution after the Revolutionary War, but
retained their colonial charters which included religious liberty clauses. The
United States Constitution did not initially include a religious liberty clause, and
in the absence of a federal law the state had sovereign authority.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60-1. The Constitution made several references to religion, all of which were
generic in nature. The Preamble speaks of “Blessings of Liberty.” Article VI
states, “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.” The date at the conclusions also makes
reference to “the Year of our Lord.”
Id. at 61.
See id. Before the Constitution was even written most of the states already had
detailed policies concerning religious liberty.
See id. at 63.
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state approval required to ensure its ratification. 45 Tension existed after
the Constitution was ratified because it did not include a bill of rights
enumerating an individual’s rights and liberties. 46 Many of the initial
framers thought a bill of rights was unnecessary to ensure individual
liberties for it was thought to be impossible to create a comprehensive
list of those liberties. 47 Ultimately, the states ratified the Constitution,
but only on the condition that there would be a Bill of Rights. 48
Seven states proposed content to be included in the Bill of Rights,
six of which submitted content concerning religious liberty. 49 The Bill
of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791. 50 Within the newly
ratified Bill of Rights, the Framers incorporated a religious liberty
clause into the First Amendment. 51 The First Amendment states,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 52 The First Amendment
religious clause can be broken down into two sub-clauses: a Free
Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause. 53
A. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” 54 This
clause serves three distinct purposes: to prevent state or government
sponsorship of religion; to prevent sending government funds to
45
46
47

48

49
50
51

52
53
54

See id.
Id. at 61-3.
See id. As James Wilson noted at the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, “[A]
bill of rights is neither an essential nor a necessary instrument in framing a system
of government, since liberty may not exist and be as well secured without it. But
it was not only unnecessary, but on this occasion it was found impracticable – for
who will be bold enough to undertake to enumerate all the rights of the people? –
and when the attempt to enumerate them is made, it must be remembered that if
the enumeration is not complete, everything not expressly mentioned will be
presumed to be purposely omitted.” Id. at 63.
See id. New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina’s proposed
language would eventually be combined into the modern language of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 63-4.
Id. at 72.
See id. There were twenty drafts of the First Amendment before the final text was
adopted.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 9-10.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religious institutions; and to protect involvement of governmental
bodies in religious activity. 55 The clause impliedly creates a “wall of
separation between church and state.” 56 Courts recognize that while
there cannot be a complete separation of church and state, there need to
be some demarcated boundaries. 57 Three tests are used to determine
those boundaries. 58 These tests are the Lemon Test, the Endorsement
Test, and the Coercion Test. 59
The Lemon Test, derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, uses a threeprong approach to determine whether a statute infringes on religious
liberty. 60 The first prong is that the statute must have a “secular,
legislative purpose.” 61 The second prong is that the primary effect of the
statute must not further or limit religion. 62 The third prong is that the
statute must not “foster an excessive government entanglement with

55
56

57

58
59

60

61

62

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
Id. The Establishment Clause refers to the First Amendment text, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. I).
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (1973)
(finding that “total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable.”). Id.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 603.
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 577 (1992).
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; David W. Cook, The Un-Established Establishment
Clause: A Circumstantial Approach to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 79-80 (2004) (citing Waltz v. Tax Comm’n of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
The court extrapolated the first two prongs of the Lemon Test from Board of
Education v. Allen, and the third prong from Waltz v. Tax Common of New York.
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. Lemon v. Kurtzman dealt with the Rhode Island 1969
Salary Supplement Act, which allowed for a 15% salary supplement to teachers
in non-public schools provided they refrain from teaching religious courses.
Additionally, it dealt with the 1968 Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, which allowed the superintendent to propose secular
classes. Citizens brought these suits claiming that the classes were a violation of
the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court found that the
Rhode Island and the Pennsylvania Acts violated the third prong of the Lemon
Test by encouraging too much entanglement between religion and state, and thus
were violations of the Establishment Clause. See generally id.
See id.
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religion.” 63 The Lemon Test is the most widely-used Establishment
Clause test. 64
The lesser-used Establishment Clause tests are the Endorsement
Test and the Coercion Test. 65 The Endorsement Test comes from Sandra
Day O’Conner’s concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly. 66 Endorsement
exists when a reasonable person observing a public display would
perceive it as conveying governmental support for a certain
religion. 67Additionally, the Coercion Test, stemming from Lee v.
Weisman, determines whether the state used coercive measures to
enforce a religion. 68

63
64

65
66

67
68

See id.
See Dean v. D.C., No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June
2, 1992); see also Matthew E. Feinberg, Esq., And the Ban Plays on . . . for Now:
Why Courts Must Consider Religion in Marriage Equality Cases, 10 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 221, 235 (2010). The Supreme Court heavily
relies on the Lemon test in Establishment cases; however, it may expand, limit, or
abandon a prong of the test depending on the circumstances. Ultimately though,
the Lemon Test is the “law of the land.” Id.
See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 234.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984); Cook, supra note 60, at 82-83.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island included a nativity
scene in its annual public Christmas display. The District Court of Rhode Island
enjoined the city from using the display. Pawtucket residents and members of the
Rhode Island branch of the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit claiming
that the display violated the Establishment Clause. On appeal, the judgment of the
District Court was affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court found
Pawtucket did not violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause because the
display did not imply government support of a particular religion. Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 671-726.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). This case was brought by a public
school student and her father to discontinue benedictions at graduation. The
principal of a middle school invited a rabbi to recite a nonsectarian prayer at the
graduation. The District Court of Rhode Island granted the injunction, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held in favor of the student and
her father. The Court reasoned that the principal’s choice to include a prayer and
choice of religious figure was attributable to the state as he was the principal of a
public school. Prayer in public schools is subtly coercive because it creates
pressure for students who may not understand the difference between respecting
a religious practice and participating in conduct that may result in the endorsement
of a particular religion. The Court ultimately determined that the Constitution
prohibits the government from coercing others to participate in religion. Id. at
577-603.
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The Establishment Clause tests are difficult to apply to same-sex
marriage cases. 69 Parties who brought same-sex marriage cases under
the Establishment Clause have been few and unsuccessful; 70 however,
there is a growing trend that supports the application of Establishment
Clause Tests to marriage ban laws and policies. 71 In the future, the
questions to be asked are whether same-sex marriage bans act to
promote a religious preference or whether there are any secular purposes
for them. 72
B. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
The First Amendment includes a Free Exercise Clause, which states
that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 73 This removed from
Congress power over an individual’s opinion, but gave Congress
authority over “actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.” 74 To bring a cause of action under the Free
Exercise Clause, a person must demonstrate that a law “improperly
burdened” a religious belief. 75
There are three different standards of review for Free Exercise
cases. 76 The first level of review is the lowest level of scrutiny or the

69
70

71
72

73
74

75

76

See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 232-36.
See Dean v. D.C., No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June
2, 1992). The plaintiffs were a same- sex couple who claimed that the court’s
interpretation of same-sex marriages violated their Due Process rights. They also
claimed that the court violated the Establishment Clause by relying on the Bible
in their interpretation of marriage. The court applied the Lemon Test and found
the law did not advance religion simply because it happened to coincide with
religious ideals. The court dismissed this charge as being frivolous. Id. at *1-8.
See Feinberg, supra note 64, at 237.
See id. The argument against laws and policies that ban same-sex marriage for
violating the Establishment Clause is that preventing same-sex marriages
advances or inhibits religion, which in turn violates the Lemon Test. See id. at
242.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 9-10. This refers to the First Amendment Free
Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
See WITTE, supra note 32, at 119. A party bringing a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause must have proper standing and cannot bring a political question.
See id.
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rational basis review. 77 A challenged law will be upheld if the
government can prove that the law is in “pursuit of a legitimate
governmental interest,” and the law is “reasonably related to the
interest.” 78 The intermediate scrutiny test requires heightened
scrutiny. 79 Under this test, a court will generally uphold a law if it
pursues an “important or significant governmental interest,” and is
“substantially related to that interest.” 80 The last test is the highest level
of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny. 81 Under this test, the court will
uphold a law if it is in “pursuit of a compelling or overriding
governmental interest,” and is “narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.” 82
The Supreme Court used a rational basis level of scrutiny when it
heard its first Free Exercise case in 1879 in Reynolds v. United States. 83
In Reynolds, the Court faced a conflict derived from the intersection of
freedom of religion and the law. 84 A man who was tried for polygamy
in violation of a Utah statute claimed that the practice was part of his
Mormon religion. 85 The Court reasoned that Utah had constitutional
authority to enact a law banning polygamy; therefore, the court held
Mormons were not exempted from the statute. 86
The Free Speech portion of the First Amendment adds an extra layer
of protection to the Free Exercise Clause. 87 In addition to the religious
clauses, the First Amendment gives people the right to speak without
77

78
79

80
81
82
83

84
85
86
87

See id. at 121-24; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878);
Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918); Employment Div., Dep’t of
Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997) (These cases all utilized the rational basis
test for causes of action brought under the Free Exercise Clause.).
See WITTE, supra note 37, at 121-24.
See id. at 121-23. In Cantwell v. Connecticut the Supreme Court raised the
heightened level of scrutiny and ruled that there were certain areas of religion the
government could not regulate unless they involved criminal actions including
religious beliefs, worship, and assembly.
See id. at 122.
See id. at 122-24; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See WITTE, supra note 37, at 122.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878). See, e.g., CONKLE, supra
note 37, at 7; WITTE, supra note 32, at 121-24.
See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 7.
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145-47.
Id. at 165-66.
See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 106.
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fear of government retribution. 88 The Free Speech Clause protects an
individual’s own religious speech from discrimination. 89
C. Modern Separation of Church and State:
The modern view of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause is
grounded in the pursuit of religious equality and non-discrimination. 90
Further, many statutes and policies apart from the Free Exercise Clause
are imbued with the value of non-discrimination. 91 With regards to
Establishment Clause cases, the Lemon Test is the primary mode in
which laws are tested to determine if they violate the First
Amendment. 92 In an increasingly homogenized world, the challenges
surrounding freedom of religion become more complex. 93
In a 2006 speech, “On Faith and Politics,” Barack Obama spoke on
the issue of evolving demographics in the United States and how that
phenomena affects the separation of church and state. 94 The United
States is comprised of people of many different faiths, and a certain
degree of separation of church and state is necessary to prevent
sectarianism. 95 Obama offered a hypothetical on the dangers of
sectarianism, by imagining a United States with only Christians.
Amongst Christians there are numerous divisions of belief, and he used
the following words to emphasize the dangers of those divisions:
Which passages of Scripture should guide our public
policy? Should we go with Leviticus, which suggests
slavery is ok and that eating shellfish is an abomination?
88
89
90
91

92
93

94

95

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See CONKLE, supra note 37, at 106.
Id. at 105-06.
See id. at 106. The Free Speech doctrine contains protections for the free exercise
of religion. Its purpose with regards to religious freedom is to provide
discrimination protections for religious speech. Moreover, legislatures have made
a recent move towards including protections against religious conduct from
discrimination.
See id. at 203.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at National Prayer Breakfast
(Feb.
5,
2015,
9:13
AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/05/remarks-president-national-prayer-breakfast
[https://perma.cc/H2L2-JTE4].
Senator Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics (June 28,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.html
[https://perma.cc/GKW9-C8LJ].
See id.

2018

Going to the Clerk's Office

113

How about Deuteronomy, which suggests stoning your
child if he strays from the faith? Or should we just stick
to the Sermon on the Mount - a passage that is so radical
that it’s doubtful that our own Defense Department
would survive its application? 96
Sectarian principles cannot govern because democracy prefers
compromise amongst all religious beliefs via the promotion of certain
universal principles from dominant religions. 97 The roots of the majority
of dominant religions do not allow for compromise when it comes to
their core tenets and beliefs. 98 Many religions offer “edicts” that must
be followed, but public policy cannot be governed in the same way. 99
Obama offered the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac to illustrate this
principle. 100 Abraham was ordered by God to sacrifice his son, but at
the last moment an angel appeared telling Abraham he passed God’s test
of devotion. 101 Obama then told the story as if it were happening in
today’s world, for if a person saw a man raising a knife to a child, one
would hope that they would call the police. 102 Not everyone will
recognize their God or gods within such limited and biblically-based
frames of reference. That is because not everyone will have the same
edicts stemming from their religious beliefs. 103 Public policy must be
constructed based on what is evident to all, not just what is evident to
those few who fall in line with a certain system of beliefs. 104
Obama returned to the theme of the dangers of sectarianism in his
remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast:
The United States is one of the most religious countries
in the world – far more religious than most Western
developed countries. And one of the reasons is that our
founders wisely embraced the separation of church and
state. Our government does not sponsor a religion, nor
does it pressure anyone to practice a particular faith, or
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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any faith at all. And the result is a culture where people
of all backgrounds and beliefs can freely and proudly
worship, without fear, or coercion. . . . 105
In an increasingly multicultural nation, Obama saw value in the
freedom of religion and found that it is best upheld through the
separation of church and state because it allows for people of all
religions to practice however they wish, free from duress. 106
III. HISTORY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Homosexuality has a long and discordant history of discrimination
under the American legal system. 107 After the Civil War, sub-cultures
began to grow that included homosexuality and gender-bending ideals,
leading many states to enact sodomy laws to counter these subcultures. 108 Conversely, there were no federal laws explicitly
prohibiting these sub-cultures, but there were laws whose side effects
limited the rights of individuals within certain homosexual subcultures. 109 These laws included the Comstock Act, prohibiting the
mailing of all obscene materials, and the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930,
prohibiting customs from allowing obscene materials to enter the
country. 110 Immigration laws also prevented those with homosexual
tendencies from entering the country in its prohibition of “sexual
degenerates.” 111
By 1960, all states had enacted sodomy laws prohibiting sex
between male same-sex partners. 112 These laws were used as a
justification for a blanket discrimination policy against homosexuals.113
However, popular media increasingly publicized homosexuality
105
106
107

108
109
110

111
112
113

See President Obama, supra note 93.
See id.
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 3; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY
LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 19-26 (1999).
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 107, at 19-26.
Id. at 34.
See id. For instance, the publications MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild Pictorial,
were deemed by the Judicial Officer of the Post Office as “not mailable” pursuant
to the Comstock Act due to their photos of semi-nude males posing suggestively.
Further, pen pal clubs catering to homosexuals were also deemed obscene. Id.
Id. at 35.
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 3.
See id.
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throughout the 1960s, 114 resulting in a growth of pro-LGBTQ
activism. 115 In 1962, the American Law Institute condemned sodomy
laws in its Model Penal Code. 116 Despite same-sex activism growing in
popularity, public opinion still weighed heavily against
homosexuality. 117
The 1970s saw a rise in gay rights organizations. 118 As gay rights
and activism gained esteem, homosexual couples sought to gain legal
recognition for the first time. 119 Many same-sex couples seeking
marriage licenses used the precedent set in Loving v. Virginia to their
advantage. 120 The Loving court found unconstitutional a ban on
interracial marriage when it determined that marriage is a fundamental
right subject to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. 121 However, the lower courts were not persuaded by
the argument that Loving should be extended to same-sex marriage. 122
They reasoned that miscegenation was distinguishable from same-sex
marriage as it applied to racial discrimination, which was based on an
immutable characteristic, and not discrimination based on sexual
orientation, which many deemed a lifestyle choice. 123
114
115

116
117
118

119

120
121
122
123

See id.
Id. at 9. An instance of activism occurred on June 28, 1969 when police in New
York raided the Stonewall Inn, which was known for having go-go boys under
the guise of not having a liquor license. The police forced the 200 male patrons to
leave that bar; however, patrons and bystanders resisted police attempts to
maintain order. The crowd began throwing trash and parking meters at police.
They also started mini demonstrations supporting homosexuality in the streets.
The crowd became so unruly that the police locked themselves inside to protect
themselves until reinforcements arrived. A fire bomb went off and injured several
police officers. After the events at the Stonewall Inn, people gathered at Sheridan
Square to demonstrate against the mistreatment of homosexual people. Id. at 1617.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9-11.
See id. at 18. Organizations such as Lambda Legal, that National Gay Task Force,
Gay Rights Advocates, the Lesbian Rights Project and the Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation gained popularity. Id.
See id. at 18-19. In Minnesota, James Michael McConnell and Jack Baker sought
a marriage license in 1971. They were married in a Methodist church, but the state
refused to recognize their marriage as valid. Id.
Id. at 19.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In the decades following, increased access to information about
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) led to an ardent push
for legal recognition of same-sex marriage. 124 By 1988, approximately
46,000 people had died from AIDS, two-thirds of whom were
homosexual men. 125 The median age of death was thirty-six. 126 Many
of these individuals were not prepared for death, and had not even
considered end-of-life decisions, such as estate planning or medical
decision-making surrogates. 127 Further, many benefits did not pass on
to same-sex partners such as health insurance or deeds to property. 128 It
became increasingly apparent that the benefits associated with marriage
would be beneficial to those individuals whose partners were suffering
from HIV/AIDs, thus adding fervor to the fight for recognition of samesex marriage. 129
There are two arguments for same-sex marriage springing from the
Fourteenth Amendment. 130 The first argument uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which deems marriage a
fundamental right of an individual. 131 Proponents of same-sex marriage
argue that because the Supreme Court does not allow the government to
institute bans on marriage based on race, imprisonment or delinquency
in paying child support, it cannot ban same-sex couples from
marriage. 132 The second argument is that same-sex marriage bans
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.133
Proponents asserted that banning same-sex marriage is sex
124
125
126
127
128
129

130
131
132

133

Id. at 49.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 49-50.
See Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a
TO
MARRY,
Transformative
Campaign,
FREEDOM
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited Dec. 2,
2016) [https://perma.cc/QV4K-GQUK].
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 53-4.
See id.
See id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring marriage
bans based on race unconstitutional); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395-96
(1978) (finding marriage bans based on fulfilling child support obligations for a
minor child not in his or her custody unconstitutional); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 99-100 (1987) (finding marriage bans between inmates or inmates and
civilians, unless there was a compelling reason for marriage, unconstitutional).
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 54.
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discrimination on its face, and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis that had not yet been applied to samesex marriage cases. 134
Nineteen ninety-six marked one of the first successes for proponents
of legalizing same-sex marriage. 135 Three same-sex couples in Hawaii
were denied marriage licenses in 1990. 136 They sought injunctive relief
from a Hawaiian statute preventing legal recognition of same-sex
marriage. 137 In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny
standard and ruled it presumptively unconstitutional to discriminate
against same-sex marriage. 138 In 1996, on remand, the court found that
same-sex couples should have the right to marry. 139 Unfortunately, in
1999 the decision was reversed in light of an amendment to the
Hawaiian Constitution banning same-sex marriage. 140
President Bill Clinton signed into law the Defense Against Marriage
Act (“DOMA”) in 1996, which severely hindered actions to legalize
same-sex marriage. 141 DOMA interprets the word “marriage” to mean
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife in all federal rulings and statements. 142
DOMA was aimed at depriving same-sex couples of the federally
guaranteed rights allotted to heterosexual couples. 143 Eventually,
DOMA was found unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor as
violating the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. 144
134
135
136
137
138

139
140
141

142
143
144

See id.
Id. at 56.
See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 538 (1993).
See id.
See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *2 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996); see also Lewin, 74 Haw. at 582.
See Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *22.
See Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 WL 35643448, at *1 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
See 1 MASS. PRAC., FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 19:16 (4th ed.). DOMA was
overwhelmingly passed in both houses: the House of Representatives: 342-67, the
Senate: 85-14. See Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story
of a Transformative Campaign - Chapter 2: Launching the Movement, FREEDOM
TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited
Dec. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GYC7-82GG].
See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1996).
See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 9.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013); see, e.g., 36 AM. JUR.
2d Proof of Facts 441 §1.51 (2017).
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In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex
marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 145 The decision
lead to microbursts of support around the country. 146 For the first time,
governors and mayors of cities were directing their clerks to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 147 While the Windsor case said
nothing about state regulation over same-sex marriage, it opened the
floodgates for plaintiffs to bring litigation claiming that a given state
lacked authority to regulate their right to marry a person of the same
sex. 148 In the six months directly following the Windsor decision, courts
were flooded with litigation over the newly unconstitutional DOMA.149
Bassett v. Snyder was the first case to cite Windsor. 150 In Bassett, the
court found a Michigan law banning public employers from providing
benefits to non-spouse partners was worthy of a preliminary
injunction. 151 In Ohio, Jim Obergefell filed suit for state recognition of
his marriage. 152 In New Jersey and New Mexico, courts struck down
same-sex marriage bans, 153 and many district courts followed. 154
145

146
147

148

149
150
151
152
153
154

See Winning the Freedom to Marry, supra note 141, at Chapter 4: Winning the
First State.
See id.
See id. San Francisco, California, Sandoval County, New Mexico, New Paltz,
New York, and Multnohmah County, Oregon followed Massachusetts’s example.
See Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52 (2015).
See id.
See id.
Id. at S59-60.
Id. at S60-61.
Id. at S61.
Id. at S61-5. The following states allowed same-sex marriage before Obergefell:
Alaska (October 12, 2014), Arizona (October 17, 2014), California (June 26,
2013), Colorado (October 6, 2014), Connecticut (November 12, 2008), Delaware
(July 1, 2013), Washington D.C. (March 3, 2010), Florida (January 6, 2015),
Hawaii (December 2, 2013), Idaho (October 15, 2014), Illinois (June 1, 2014),
Indiana (October 6, 2014), Iowa (April 27, 2009), Maine (December 29, 2012),
Maryland (January 1, 2013), Massachusetts (May 17, 2004), Minnesota (August
1, 2013), Montana (November 19, 2015), Nevada (October 9, 2014), New
Hampshire (January 1, 2010), New Jersey (October 21, 2013), New Mexico
(December 19, 2013), New York (July 24, 2011), North Carolina (October 13,
2014),Oklahoma (October 6, 2014), Oregon (May 19, 2014), Pennsylvania (May
20, 2014), Rhode Island (August 1, 2013), South Carolina (November 20, 2014),
Utah (October 6, 2014),Vermont (September 1, 2009), Virginia (October 6,
2014), Washington (December 6, 2012), West Virginia (October 9, 2014),
Wisconsin (October 6, 2014) and Wyoming (October 21, 2014). The following

2018

Going to the Clerk's Office

119

Circuit courts began to issue decisions on same-sex marriage
recognition. 155 The Tenth Circuit ruled same-sex marriage bans were
unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Hebert. 156 The Fourth Circuit followed
suit. 157 In September 2014, the rush of legal recognition for same-sex
marriage hit a road bump in the Louisiana case Robicheaux v. Caldwell
as the court found a same-sex marriage ban constitutional. 158 On several
occasions, LGBTQ activist groups appealed to the Supreme Court to
consider their cases, but the Supreme Court remained removed from the
discussion, claiming it would not hear any cases regarding the issue
unless there was a circuit split. 159 The Sixth Circuit created the longawaited circuit split when it ruled that same-sex marriage bans were
constitutional in what would come to be known as the seminal case
Obergefell v. Hodges. 160
IV. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Obergefell v. Hodges and State Reactions
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment required states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. 161 It found so because the fundamental liberties outlined within
the Constitution help citizens “define and express their identity,” and
the Fourteenth Amendment ensures all citizens enjoy those liberties.162
Fourteen same-sex couples and two men with deceased partners brought

155
156
157

158
159
160

161
162

states recognized same-sex marriage only after Obergefell: Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. See Winning
TO
MARRY,
in
the
States,
FREEDOM
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/winning-in-the-states (last visited Dec. 2,
2016) [https://perma.cc/88HP-GQTD].
See Watts, supra note 148, at S65-66.
See id.
Id. at S66. Louisiana, unlike all other states, is a civil law jurisdiction; see also
Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A
Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation,
65 LA. L. REV. 775, 792 (2005).
See Watts, supra note 148, at S66.
Id. at S68.
Id. at S68-9; see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert.
granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588.
Id. at 2593.
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suit against government officials refusing to recognize the validity of
their choice to marry a person of the same sex. 163 They claimed this was
a violation of both their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and
Due Process rights. 164 The couples initially filed suit in their home
district courts and were successful. 165 However, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in DeBoer v. Snyder reversed all of the previous decisions
by finding the Constitution does not require states to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples or even recognize same-sex marriages
from other states. 166 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to
review these decisions. 167 The Supreme Court effectively expanded the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a person
cannot be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” 168 As a result, the Court found that people have the right to choose
whom they marry, regardless of sex, as a part of their individual
autonomy, thus reversing the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 169
Obergefell set off a firestorm of political opinion as leaders around
the country praised or lamented the decision. 170 Attorney General Ken
Paxton of Texas was amongst those allegedly aggrieved by the ruling. 171
He stated, “the United States Supreme Court again ignored the text and
spirit of the Constitution to manufacture a right that simply does not
exist.” 172 He claimed the Justices acted detrimentally to the
Constitution. 173 He further argued that the Supreme Court weakened the
words of the Constitution, and thus weakened the law. 174 Paxton
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167
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170
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 2597.
Id. at 2599, 2608.
See McLaughlin, supra note 17.
Attorney General Paxton: Religious Liberties of Texas Public Officials Remain
Constitutionally Protected After Obergefell v. Hodges, THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX.:
KEN
PAXTON
(June
28,
2105),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/static/5144.html [https://perma.cc/RC9KPBTQ].
See id.
See id.
See id.
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lamented this fact, but also used the ruling as a battle cry for religious
liberty. 175
Ken Paxton proclaimed the essential problem of Obergefell is that
public officials need guidance on how to implement the ruling while
remaining loyal to the core tenets of their faith. 176 He claimed public
officials’ dual duties to their faith and the principles of the Constitution
were now in conflict, and many were lost as to what to do regarding its
implementation. 177 Texas officials came to the solution that clerks and
other public officials had the ability to seek accommodations for their
religious beliefs regarding same-sex marriages. 178 Further, Paxton
determined that justices of the peace and judges were under no
obligation to conduct same-sex wedding ceremonies when they felt that
their religious beliefs prevented them from so doing. 179
Moreover, Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore told
the probate judges not to issue any marriage licenses. 180 The Alabama
Supreme Court supported this notion by issuing a writ of mandamus
suspending the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples for
twenty-five days. 181 The Court of the Judiciary ultimately suspended
Chief Justice Roy Moore for the remainder of his term ending in
2019. 182 Additionally, Louisiana refused to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples for either twenty-five days or until the Supreme Court
issued a mandate requiring them to do so. 183 Louisiana officials believed
the Obergefell ruling took away a right that should have been left for
the states to resolve. 184
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See McLaughlin, supra note 17.
See
id.
For
a
copy
of
the
writ
of
mandamus
see
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2015/images/06/29/al.pdf
(Dec.
2,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/6YDZ-22JE].
Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay
Marriage
Order,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
30,
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/roy-moore-alabama-chiefjustice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VU43-H8WK].
See McLaughlin, supra note 17.
Press Release, Attorney General Buddy Caldwell of Louisiana, Statement on
Today’s
Supreme
Court
Ruling
(June
26,
2015)
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B. The Case Analysis of Miller v. Davis
April Miller and Karen Roberts wanted to celebrate their elevenyear relationship by getting married, and after the Obergefell decision
they could do so in their home state of Kentucky. 185 The couple tried
marrying twice before but was denied a marriage license on both
occasions. 186 On their third visit to the Rowan County Clerk’s office
following the Obergefell decision, they were denied again. 187
Additionally, another same-sex and two heterosexual couples were
denied marriage licenses. 188 Following Obergefell, Kim Davis, head
clerk of Rowan County Clerk’s office announced that Rowan County
would not issue marriage licenses to any couples. 189 Together, the four
couples filed an injunction in the District Court of Kentucky to enjoin
Davis from enforcing her personal marriage license policy as it was in
violation of the law. 190
In implementing this policy, Davis claimed she was protecting her
right of freely exercising her religion as an Apostolic Christian. 191 In
furtherance of her policy, Davis did not allow any clerks to authorize
marriage licenses because her name was on the document. 192 Same-sex
marriage was contrary to her Apostolic Christian beliefs, and she feared
that having her name on marriage licenses for same-sex couples would
be viewed as her endorsement of the practice. 193 She argued there was
an available alternative for couples because they could obtain marriage
licenses from Rowan County Judge Executive Blevins. 194 However,
when couples attempted to get marriage licenses from Blevins, he was
unable to do so as the law only permits him to issue marriage licenses

185
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187
188
189
190
191
192
193
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https://www.ag.state.la.us/Article.aspx?articleID=1037&catID=5
[https://perma.cc/63KD-ZAB4].
See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
See Gabe Gutierrez & Daniella Silva, Couple Suing Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis
Over Marriage License Plan to Wed Friday, NBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:28 PM)
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/couple-suing-kentucky-clerk-kimdavis-over-marriage-licenses-plans-n421402) [https://perma.cc/TL24-447X].
See Miller 123 F. Supp. 3d at 930.
See id.
Id. at 929.
See id.
Id. at 932.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 930.
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when the elected county clerk is absent. 195 Since Davis was still
performing other aspects of her position, she could not be deemed
absent, thus Blevins could not issue marriage licenses. 196
Governor Beshear of Kentucky foresaw religion being a concern
with regards to the Obergefell decision. 197 In acknowledgment of this
he stated:
You can continue to have your own personal beliefs but,
you’re also taking an oath to fulfill the duties prescribed
by law, and if you are at that point to where your
personal convictions tell you that you simply cannot
fulfill your duties that you were elected to do, th[e]n
obviously an honorable course to take is to resign and
let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill
those duties. 198
According to Governor Beshear, Kim Davis did not take the honorable
course because she did not resign. 199 She remained in her position and
continued to refuse to fulfill all the duties of her position. 200
The Obergefell decision and the reaction of Kim Davis formed the
basis of a widespread concern. 201 For instance, 57 out of the 120 clerks
in Kentucky were of the same religion as Davis. 202 The court needed to
consider the possible ramifications that might occur if it granted Davis
the right to excuse herself from executing marriage licenses. 203 There
was a potential for a snowball effect — the fifty-seven clerks who were
of the same religious belief as Davis may follow her in asking for a
religious exemption if the court granted her plea for an exemption from
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 204 The court had to make
a decision as the potential for damage to same-sex couples was
exponential. 205
195
196
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198
199
200
201
202
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See id.
See id.
Id. at 932.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 935-36.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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District Court Judge David Bunning found Davis in contempt of
court, and as a result she was jailed for five days. 206 In April 2016,
Governor Matt Blevin signed into law a statute that allowed clerks to
remove their names from marriage licenses, and as such Davis asked the
Sixth Circuit to dismiss her appeal. 207
C. Exemption for Reasons of Religious Belief
A law in and of itself may not be a violation of the Establishment or
the Free Exercise Clauses, but a law may still be offensive to an
individual’s religious beliefs. 208 Exemptions allow an individual to be
excluded from the enforcement of or obligations imposed by the law if
they successfully present a need for one based on religious beliefs. 209 In
Sherbert v. Verner, a seven-day Adventist was denied unemployment
benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays, citing religious
beliefs as the reason for her absence. 210 The Court held she was
exempted from the law. 211 Exemptions can only occur when two
circumstances are present. 212 The first circumstance is the law is
burdensome on a person’s free exercise of religion. 213 The second
circumstance is there is a substantial state interest served by the
infringement on a person’s religious beliefs. 214 To override a person’s
religious belief the state interest must be of the upmost importance.215
206
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See Corky Siemaszko, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis, Who Refused to Issue Marriage
Licenses to Gays, Seeks to End Case, NBC NEWS (June 21, 2016, 2:28 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-whorefused-issue-marriage-licenses-gays-n596476 [https://perma.cc/S4CZ-JX2C];
see also Gabe Gutierrez & Erik Ortiz, Same-Sex Couples Receive Marriage
Licenses in Kentucky as Clerk Kim Davis Remains in Jail, NBC NEWS (Sep. 4,
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kim-davis-kentucky-clerk-willstay-jail-long-it-takes-n421676 [https://perma.cc/5Q7J-JQSP].
See Siemaszko, supra note 206. (“A marriage license which provides for the
entering of: (a) An authorization statement of the county clerk issuing the license
[sic] for any person or religious society authorized to perform marriage
ceremonies to unite in marriage the persons [sic] name. . . .”). See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN § 402.100 (West 2017).
See Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 858 (2004).
See id.; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
See Hamburger, supra note 208, at 858.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
Id. at 403-06.
Id. at 403-05
See id.at 405-06
See id. at 406.
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The flaw with this test is that there is no defined limit on what qualifies
as a person’s religious belief and what they can claim as such in order
to be exempted from a particular law. 216 The potential for abusing
exemptions is great if one uses the exemption test as a tool to escape the
provisions or effects of all laws. 217
Further, the exemption test does not directly address government
officials and whether they can be exempted from performing official
duties they believe are contrary to their religious beliefs. 218 Government
officials, whether elected or appointed, are to serve the general
public. 219 If they were to claim an exemption from performing a portion
of their job, it would create a hazardous precedent because they are
failing to serve a portion of the public for whom they were elected or
appointed to serve. 220 Moreover, there is the problem with a potential
snowball effect. 221 If one clerk is allowed to refrain from issuing
marriage licenses, then how many others will follow suit? 222 How would
a potential snowball effect influence other areas of law in which there
may be conflicts between law and religion? 223 How would this affect
other public officials and service providers such as hospitals or
shelters? 224
V. PRESCRIPTIVE BALANCING TEST
The complexity of Miller v. Davis demonstrates the need for a clear
test to determine when government officials can be exempted from
performing their public duties citing religious reasons. 225 Below are
several factors to be included in a balancing test concerning occasions
where government officials could be exempted from issuing marriage
216
217
218
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220
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222
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224
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See Hamburger, supra note 208, at 869.
See id.
See Frank S. Ravitch, Complementary or Competing Freedoms: Government
Officials, Religious Freedom, and Lgbtq Rights, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 163,
164-65 (2015).
Id. at 167.
See id.
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government Out of Marriage” Post
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licenses to same-sex couples based on religious objections. 226 These
factors include: the accessibility of alternatives; denial of the benefits of
marriage; irreparable harm to the plaintiffs; whether the official is
elected or appointed; harm to government officials; and the feasibility
of exemption.
A. Accessibility of Alternatives
When there are reasonable alternatives available to a party seeking
a service that a government official is unwilling to provide based on
personal religious beliefs, this may be an argument for the government
official’s exemption from providing the service they find offensive. 227
Kim Davis argued there were multiple reasonable alternatives to getting
a marriage license issued from the Rowan County Clerk’s office. 228
These options included obtaining a marriage license from one of the
other seven local county clerks offices, going to the Rowan County
Judge Executive or other alternative methods that may be determined. 229
There are numerous apparent issues with these suggested alternative
options for same-sex couples. For example, there are several challenges
with finding alternative locations to get a marriage license. 230 The first
challenge is transportation. 231 Transportation to an alternate location
may not be convenient or feasible for some couples. 232 Furthermore,
there are additional financial costs associated with finding an alternative
location such as public transportation costs or gas. 233 While there are
available alternatives in the form of other counties, these counties are
not the county in which the couple lives. 234 The couple may have strong
social ties to a particular community, and it may hold greater
sentimental value to be married in that community. 235 Moreover, samesex couples argue that they pay taxes in a particular community and,
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therefore, they have the right to exercise their federally endowed rights
in the same community. 236
In addition to alternative locations, there also must be alternative
public officials available to perform civil unions and issue marriage
licenses when a government official claims they should be exempted
from issuing marriage licenses. 237 The test must account for the
possibility that clerks in surrounding counties may also express
religious condemnation of the law, and refuse to issue marriage
licenses. 238 If this were the case, the available alternatives would be
severely limited if available at all. 239 For instance, there are 120 clerks
in Kentucky, and 57 clerks who expressed religious condemnation of
the Obergefell decision, calling for Governor Beshear to hold a special
session of the legislature to discuss the religious implications of the
decision. 240 The fact that so many clerks expressed religious beliefs in
conflict with the Obergefell decision presents the potential for a
disastrous domino effect of prohibiting same-sex couples from
exercising their newly guaranteed right to marry. 241 If Davis were
exempted from issuing marriage licenses, then the fifty-seven other
clerks who expressed religious opposition of same-sex marriage might
also claim that they should be exempted, which means nearly half of the
officials elected or appointed to issue marriage licenses would refuse to
issue them to an entire class of people. 242 This exponentially decreases
the number of potential alternative clerks available to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. 243
Moreover, the District Court of Eastern Kentucky dismissed as
infeasible Davis’s claim that the Rowan County Judge Executive could
issue marriage licenses instead. 244 The local statute allows the Judge
Executive to issue marriage licenses only in the absence of the county
clerk which, as previously stated, was inapplicable since Davis was
continuing in her other public duties.245 Additionally, if the Judge
236
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Executive were to assume this as part of his or her duties, he or she
would be excessively burdened, and it would exceed the scope of his or
her employment. 246
B. Denial of Benefits of Marriage
Courts must incorporate into their analysis all the state and federal
benefits denied to same-sex couples when they are not permitted to
obtain a marriage license. 247 The denial of marriage licenses is not just
a denial of a document; it is a denial of many rights entitled to married
couples. 248 Further, the denial of marriage licenses prevents same-sex
partners from making medical decisions for each other in cases where
one partner is incapacitated. 249 As of December 31, 2003, following the
Windsor decision declaring DOMA unconstitutional, the United States
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified 1,138 benefits
within federal statutes where marriage is a factor in determining
eligibility for those benefits. 250
The GAO extrapolated thirteen areas in which marital status is a
factor in determining eligibility for benefits and privileges. 251 These
areas include: (1) Social Security and Related Programs, Housing and
Food Stamps; (2) Veteran’s Benefits; (3) Taxation; (4) Federal Civilian
and Military Service Benefits; (5) Employment Benefits and Related
Statutory Benefits; (6) Immigration, Naturalization, and Aliens; (7)
Indians; (8) Trade, Commerce, and Intellectual Property; (9) Financial
Disclosure and Conflict of Interest; (10) Crimes and Family Violence;
(11) Loans, Guarantees, and Payments in Agriculture; (12) Federal
Natural Resources and Related Statutory Provisions; and (13)
Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions. 252 These designated areas clearly
cover a broad range of benefits that impact almost every aspect of one’s
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life, and have the potential to significantly improve the quality of life
for one and one’s spouse.
Some of the most critical benefits of married couples are those
related to healthcare and medical surrogacy. 253 Marriage allows spousal
access to each partner’s health insurance plan. 254 Marriage also allows
people to act as medical decision-makers in cases where one spouse is
incapacitated. 255 In the case In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski,
Karen Thompson, Sharon Kowalski’s partner, challenged the trial
court’s decision to appoint Kowalski’s father as her guardian after
Kowalski was injured in a car accident that left her paralyzed and unable
to speak. 256 Kowalski and Thompson had been cohabitating for four
years. 257 Further, they were each other’s insurance beneficiaries, and
had exchanged rings. 258 Initially, Thompson set aside her petition for
guardianship with the understanding that Kowalski’s father would allow
her to be part of the decision-making process. 259 Kowalski’s father
subsequently got a court order terminating Thompson’s visitation
rights. 260 After some time, the court ruled Kowalski competent enough
to honor her request to visit with Thompson, her partner. 261 Kowalski’s
father relinquished his claim of guardianship, and Thompson petitioned
for guardianship. 262 Thompson’s petition was denied in favor of a
Kowalski family friend. 263 On appeal, the court found Thompson
suitable to act as guardian to Kowalski. 264 This case demonstrates how
important medical surrogacy is to married couples as oftentimes one’s
spouse has the most information about the current physical condition of
their spouse, and what is best for them. 265
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Furthermore, social security is another benefit where marriage plays
a factor in one’s eligibility. 266 Following Windsor’s finding that DOMA
was unconstitutional, same-sex couples in states where same-sex
marriages were recognized became eligible for spousal social security
benefits. 267 Upon the ruling in Obergefell on June 26, 2015, the Social
Security Administration recognized all same-sex marriages, and
acknowledged their eligibility for spousal benefits. 268
In denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, they are denied
hundreds of rights. 269 It is important to balance all that is being denied
to a same-sex couple when they are denied a marriage license with the
hardship faced by a government official who has a religious objection
to the Obergefell decision. 270 People get married because they love one
another, and with that comes an intimate knowledge of one’s spouse,
which places them in the best position to make decisions for one
another. 271 To deny same-sex couples the benefits of marriage is to deny
the couple their most knowledgeable decision-maker if something
should happen to the other. 272 It is to deny the spouse estate and tax
benefits. 273 It is to deny the spouse over 1,138 federal benefits obtained
through marriage. 274
C. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiffs - Fourteenth
Amendment Right Denial
A party will suffer irreparable harm when they are deprived of a
constitutional right. 275 In cases where same-sex marriage licenses are
denied, the Fourteenth Amendment may be implicated as it contains two
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clauses applicable to marriage. 276 These are the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. 277 The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
do not allow a state to make a law that, “deprive[s] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 278
The petitioners in Obergefell claimed that the Fourteenth
Amendment is implicated in cases where same-sex marriage is
denied. 279 The petitioners asserted the argument made in Loving was
analogous to their case, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment was
applicable. 280 The couple at the heart of Loving had violated Virginia’s
anti-miscegenation laws by marrying members of a different race. 281
Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, legally
married in Washington D.C. 282 They moved to Virginia, where they
were charged with violating that state’s interracial marriage statute. 283
The Lovings were sentenced to one year in jail, but their sentence was
postponed for twenty-five years on the condition that they leave
Virginia and not return together while still married. 284 The couple
moved to set aside the judgement claiming the interracial marriage ban
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. 285 The court found the statute was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because no government interest necessitates the
facial discrimination that is evident in the Virginia statute. 286 Further,
the Virginia statute implicated the Lovings’ Due Process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment because marriage is a fundamental personal
right, and the Virginia statute was depriving the Lovings of that right.287
The petitioners in Obergefell echoed the Fourteenth Amendment
argument in Loving, asserting the Due Process and Equal Protection
276
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Clauses applied to same-sex marriage. 288 They claimed that the
Fourteenth Amendment “Due Process Clause extend[s] to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.” 289 The Court in
Loving found a nexus between a person’s liberty and marriage, and
petitioners in Obergefell claimed this notion should be extended to
same-sex couples. 290 Moreover, the petitioners in Obergefell argued that
they were denied their Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment because they were denied rights that are granted to
heterosexual couples similarly situated regarding marriage. 291 The
Obergefell decision made clear the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
heterosexual marriages and same-sex marriages equally. 292 The couple
is being denied their Fourteenth Amendment Right when they are not
permitted to get a marriage license. 293 The Fourteenth Amendment right
is inclusive of all people as evidenced by the language “any person.”294
“Any person” includes homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. 295 By this
logic, individuals in same-sex marriages should be afforded the same
rights as individuals in heterosexual marriages. 296
D. Elected or Appointed Government Officials
Government officials are elected or appointed for the specific
purpose of serving the public and generally have a variety duties that
may affect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of other. 297 What
happens when an official cannot perform one of his or her duties for
religious reasons? Does the official’s refusal to issue marriage licenses
in accordance with her religious beliefs prevent her from performing her
other duties? 298 Generally, the answer to this question is no.299 In the
case of Davis v. Miller, Kim Davis performed her other public duties
288
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during the time she was not issuing marriage licenses. 300 If officials are
capable of continuing in their other duties, then an exemption from the
specific duty of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples may be
tolerable. 301
Conversely, there is the concern that there must be someone else
available to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples if the official
were exempted from this duty. 302 In cases where there are no officials
available to perform the job, then an exemption would not be prudent.303
North Carolina and Utah have developed models allowing for
government officials who may harbor religious opposition to a certain
duty to remain in their official capacity while not hindering the rights of
a certain class of people. 304 These models ensure that there are alternate
officials capable of issuing marriage licenses and performing civil
ceremonies for same-sex couples, while also providing the opportunity
for those with religious objections to excuse themselves from that
duty. 305
The North Carolina legislature passed §51-5.5, which deals with
recusal of public officials. 306 This statute allows magistrates to recuse
themselves from performing marriage ceremonies if they have a
“sincerely held religious objection.” 307 Further, the statute allows for the
assistant register of deeds and deputy registers of deeds to recuse
themselves from issuing marriage licenses. 308 However, the office must
provide an alternative public official to perform civil ceremonies and
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 309 Moreover, Utah’s model
ensures there will be a “willing” clerk available during business hours
to solemnize any marriage. 310
The fact that all government officials take an oath to support the
United States Constitution under Article VI must be taken into
300
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consideration when determining whether an official should be exempted
from a particular duty due to religious objections. 311 Article VI states,
“all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution . . . .” 312 Kim Davis’s actions violated her sworn oath to
protect and defend the Constitution.313 Davis argued that she did not
violate this oath because her requirement to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was a religious test, which was a violation of the Oath
Clause of the Constitution. 314 Article VI does include a provision
stating, “[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States.” 315 The religious test
provision is generally applied to candidates for official positions, and
not people already in their official capacities. 316 If this principle were
applied to Miller v. Davis, Kim Davis would not be able to claim a
religious test violation. 317
E. Harm to Government Official
Another factor of the balancing test involves a consideration of the
potential harm to a government official in not granting an exemption
based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. In issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, Kim Davis claimed she was compromising her
Apostolic Christian beliefs. 318 Further, she claimed that her name
appearing on all marriage licenses equated to an endorsement of the
institution of same-sex marriage, and thus issuing these marriage
licenses would be a violation of her First Amendment right of free
speech. 319
Case precedent supports the idea that harm to the government
official must be considered when determining if there was a free speech
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violation. 320 Connick v. Myers involved an assistant district attorney
whose employment was abruptly terminated for allegedly exercising her
constitutional right to free speech. 321 The assistant district attorney was
given a transfer with which she was unhappy, and in turn she distributed
a questionnaire measuring her co-workers’ support of supervisors and
the transfer policy. 322 She was ultimately terminated for refusing her
transfer. 323 She then brought suit claiming she was fired because she
exercised her right of free speech in distributing her questionnaire. 324
To determine whether an official’s right to free speech has been
violated, the court must balance the rights of the official as a citizen
versus the state’s need to promote efficiency of the public services its
employees perform. 325 Further, the court must look at the official’s
speech with regards to “content, form and context.” 326 The court found
the assistant district attorney’s First Amendment right of free speech had
not been violated because she was not expressing an issue of public
concern, but rather one of personal concern over her transfer. 327 A court
would most likely dismiss Davis’s Free Speech violation claim under
the Myers standard. 328 Davis does have the right to free speech, and that
right may be impeded by the fact that her name appears on all marriage
licenses in her county. 329 However, this would most likely be
outweighed by the state’s need to promote efficiency of the public
service its employees perform in issuing marriage licenses. 330
Davis’s policy of not issuing any marriage licenses was an
inefficient response to Obergefell in that it deprived the public of the
official duties of the clerk’s office to which they were legally entitled.331
Additionally, this efficiency consideration impacts many of the factors
previously noted in this comment, such as availability of alternatives

320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 147.
See id.
Id. at 138.
See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 932 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
See Miller, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 939.

136

UMass Law Review

v. 13 | 100

and denial of benefits. 332 By refusing to issue marriage licenses out of
the Rowan County Clerk’s Office, she forced couples to travel to
alternate locations, which may have been burdensome or infeasible.
Further, her actions deprived people of the numerous tangible benefits
attached to marriage. 333
F. Exemption: Compelling Interest Requirement
For a government official to be exempted based on religious
objections they must express a compelling interest. 334 In Miller v. Davis,
Davis said her compelling interest was the protection of her own
religious freedom. 335 While the state does have an interest in allowing
the free exercise of religion, it also has an interest in preventing the
imposition of religion on others. 336 Davis imposed her religion on others
by refusing to issue marriage licenses to anyone, and by further
forbidding any of her fellow clerks to issue licenses in her stead. 337 The
court was unpersuaded by the personal interest Davis claimed. 338
Furthermore, Davis’s policy hindered the state interests of
efficiency and applying the law evenly. 339 Her failure to abide by the
Obergefell decision was neither efficient nor an even application of the
law. 340 The court found that Davis’s policy in the Rowan County
Clerk’s office served no compelling state interest. 341 Supreme Court
decisions are due deference and respect. 342 By not abiding by the law
set forth in Obergefell, Davis created a dangerous precedent with
potentially disastrous consequences. 343
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VI. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Denied . . .
Because two civil liberties are in conflict . . . 344
And no one knows which will win or if both will lose. 345
No one won in Miller v. Davis. 346 Yes, April Miller and Karen
Roberts got married. 347 Yes, Kim Davis had her name removed from all
marriage licenses issued out of the Rowan County Clerk’s Office. 348
However, these small victories in the battle for same-sex marriage
highlight an even bigger problem. 349 Kim Davis is one of many who
expressed religious objections to the Obergefell decision. 350 What if all
of those who expressed religious objections claimed they too could not
issue marriage licenses? 351 All it would take is a slight change in the
political climate or one charismatic believer to act as a martyr in the
opposition to same-sex marriage to cause the tenuous walls created by
the Obergefell decision to come crumbling down. 352 What occurred in
Miller v. Davis was a bandage; it was not a solution. 353
Government officials know what their duties are, and they should
resign if they cannot perform those duties. 354 Religious exemption from
enforcing or abiding by a law should come with a strict standard for
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government officials. 355 The balancing test described above provides a
framework for this standard. 356 Additionally, sexual orientation should
be a protected class. If sexual orientation were a protected class, there
would be redress available against those who discriminate based on
sexual orientation. 357 This would add teeth to the suggested balancing
test above because it elevates sexual orientation to the same level as that
of a protected class. The Supreme Court must decide this issue. On April
4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College
of Indiana ruled that discrimination based on sexual orientation was
against the Civil Rights Act of 1864 in an 8-3 decision. 358 This may be
the very impetus the Supreme Court needs to weigh in on the issue of
whether sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class. 359 When two
civil liberties battle, “no one knows which will win or if both will
lose.” 360 Until the court applies a stricter standard for religious
exemptions to government officials, no one will win. 361
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